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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper seeks to make a critical review of the current status of the 
constitionalised panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) in India as institutions of self 
government and as instruments of planning for economic development and social 
justice in the light of empirical evidence collected by the researchers  and critical 
analysis of the some of the actions of state . The background of the rise of the "new" 
panchayat system has been narrated in a nut shell to enable the readers to have an 
idea of the conceptual and institutional framework of the panchayat system Keeping 
the central objective in mind the article focuses on the challenges faced by the third 
generation PRIs in India from within and without and attempts to make an 
assessment about the   future of these institutions.  Reference has been made to the 
experience of some of the states in order to support the comments and observations. 
The article argues that despite the constitutional amendment to regenerate the PRIs 
there is still lack of genuine and strong political interest and bureaucratic support 
to fuel the institutions. These have been manifested in the actions of the state after 
the constitution has been amended. The traditional factors   rooted in the socio-
economic structure and political dynamics of the rural society continue to plague 
the working of these democratic institutions. It has been contended that there is 
need for another round of constitutional amendment coupled with continuous 
political and administrative support to ensure steady growth of the PRIs. The 
author finds a ray of hope in the rise of civil society organizations which have 
started acting as watchdogs in some of the states. They are working not only for 
generating awareness among the stakeholders but also for organizing the villagers 
to assert their rights and in this respect, the right to information has come as great 
boon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The idea of decentralisation is to a certain extent embedded in the democratic ideal 
as applied to political organisation. It is a contrivance of human wisdom in order to 
promote the democratic ideal. Democracy as a form of political organisation may 
be viewed as an attempt at the right ordering of people‟s partnership not merely in 
the sovereign power of the state but also in the day-to-day working of government. 
As J.S.Mill says, the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of 
the social state is one in which the whole people participate. 
 
 
THE RISE OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA: 
THE FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS OF PANCHAYATI RAJ 
 
Panchayati raj as a concrete form of democratic decentralisation in rural India, is a 
creation of the colonial rulers. The birth of PRIs (Panchayati Raj Institutions) in 
independent India, however, owes its origin to the Balvantrai Mehta Committee 
Report. The Committee stressed the need to develop a network of three-tiered 
elective institutions known as the panchayati raj and gave birth to what can be 
called the first generation panchayati raj in India.
3
 Outlining the concept, the report 
observes that PRIs would be representative bodies and vigorous democratic 
institutions in order to take charge of all aspects of development work in the 
villages. The committee proposed a model of panchayati raj with three tiers – 
Gram Panchayat at the base, Panchayat Samiti at the intermediate block level and 
Zilla Parishad at the apex.  
 
The first generation PRIs encountered potent and widespread distrust from 
their very inception. The bureaucracy could not agree to share power with people 
but had to accept the panchayati raj system because of the existing political support 
for it. The process of bureaucratization gained considerable ground in the 1960s 
and more focus was given to production oriented programmes to meet the 
increasing demand for food which increased the hold of the bureaucracy and in the 
process, the PRIs were bypassed.  
 
Added to this, was a growing centralisation of the Indian polity which reached 
its culmination during the days of emergency. The lack of constitutional sanction 
and conceptual clarity about the role of PRIs made it possible for policy makers to 
accept it either as an agent of government or as institutions of self-government. 
This paved the road towards the slow decline of the system and by the end of the 
1960s, the PR (Panchayati Raj) system was moribund throughout the country. 
The Asok Mehta Committee, which examined the issue in 1978, prepared a blue 
print for the second generation panchayats. Having departed from the constitutional 
model, the second Mehta Committee conceptualized PRIs as instruments of rural 
development. It regarded the revenue district as the first point of decentralization 
below the state level and recommended two- tiered PRIs. Only four states namely, 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and West Bengal, began to try out the system 
but political changes in all the states except West Bengal stood in the way.  
The progress was so slow that the Indian State had to amend the Constitution in 
1992 to revitalize the system of Panchayati Raj. Political exigencies seemed to 
have played a major role when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi started taking about 
the regeneration of Panchayati Raj. In the 1970s and 1980s the nation witnessed a 
series of movements across the country (e.g. militant movements in Punjab, the 
                                                 
3
 Prabhat Datta (1998) Major Issues in the Development Debate, New Delhi : Kanishka, pp 
14-19 
Prabhat Datta 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / w w w . h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  4 9 ,  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 9                                               3 
Gorkhaland movement in West Bengal, the Jharkhand movement etc.) based on 
primordial loyalties like religion, ethnicity, language. It was difficult for the state 
governments to handle the issues efficiently, bringing the republic under great 
stress. It was then realised that power had to be shared with local communities. The 
autonomous local level of self-government was considered to be a safety valve, 
capable of preventing the recurrence of such incidents. The Constitution was 
therefore amended in 1992 to lay the foundation stone of the third generation of the 
Panchayati Raj in India. 
 
 
RURAL INDIA: SOME BASIC FACTS 
 
Before we analyze the dynamics of how PRIs function in India, it is useful to have 
a quick look at the rural, socio-economic scene for, as Gandhiji used to say, India 
lives in villages. This is true for India even today despite the second wave of 
urbanization which in this new millennium has been fast spreading across 
developing countries. India continues to be one of the least urbanized countries in 
the world for a little more than 70 per cent of the total population still lives in 
villages. 
 
The rural economy of India continues to account for 49 per cent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Agriculture is the mainstay of the rural economy and 
cultivation of land is conditioned by the varied geo-physical conditions of the 
country. Land being the basic asset, a rural Indian without land is reduced to the 
status of a seasonal labourer, working and harvesting the lands of others. Land 
distribution continues to be very much skewed. The top 5.2 per cent of the rural 
households today own 42.8 per cent of the area, and the top 9.5 per cent own 56.6 
per cent of the area. The remaining 90.5 per cent of the rural households own just 
43.4 per cent of the area. Among them, is 41 .6 per cent of the rural households 
who own no land other than their homestead land (10 per cent do not even have 
homestead land.)
4
 
 
It needs to be kept in mind that the socio-economic structure of rural India 
varies from region to region, the cause for which lies embedded in colonial rule. 
During the colonial period government policy with regard to land settlement and 
the extent of commercial penetration in the agrarian economy differed from region 
to region depending on various considerations such as the extraction of raw 
materials, mobilization of revenues, defence etc. The eastern states were major 
contributors to the British exchequer. This extraction of revenue was facilitated by 
a large band of revenue collectors who later on became the absentee landlords. The 
zamindari system of land tenure was introduced throughout the eastern states. This 
led to sub-infeudation and the growth of a parasite class of landlords, merchants 
and moneylenders. In contrast, the western region comprising present-day Punjab, 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and coastal Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu had a tenurial 
system based on peasant proprietorship which was conducive to personal initiative 
and entrepreneurship. 
 
The Green Revolution added a new dimension to the rural socio-economic 
scenario by increasing the degree of inequality between perennially irrigated 
regions and those depended mainly on rainfall for cultivation. However, this 
benefited the upper middle and richer sections more than the middle and poorer 
sections as they have lands. Consequently, socio-economic inequalities have been 
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steadily increasing. About two thirds of India's more than one billion people live in 
rural areas and almost 170 million of them are poor. Three out of 4 India's rural 
poor live in large rural areas and for more than 20 per cent of them poverty is a 
chronic condition. 
 
A class of rich peasant is today consolidating itself in different states, thanks 
to the support of the state. The technological and infrastructural modernization of 
rural India in terms of electrification, provision of artificial irrigation, chemical 
inputs, setting up of agricultural and other co-operatives and marketing institutions, 
and extensive development of rural banks has meant a consolidation of the rural 
rich. This land-based class captures the major benefits of the development 
programmes initiated by the state and exercises social and political domination 
over the villages through their economic clout and through pre-capitalist 
institutions like caste coupled with the tradition of domination. 
 
Almost 50 per cent of the farming households are indebted as per the 59th 
round data of the National Sample Survey Organization. Nearly half of rural 
households are landless. In 1999-2000 almost 77 per cent of the rural people ate 
less than the international daily minimum of 2100 kilo calorie. 
 
The introduction of the first generation grassroots democratic institutions in 
this kind of social structure failed to bring about any noticeable change in the life 
of the large mass of rural population, as they were captured by the landed gentry 
and high caste people. As expected the institutions fell easy prey to the dominant 
power groups in the class-caste divided society wherever they worked and 
remained dormant in most of the states. 
 
 
THE THIRD GENERATION PANCHAYATS IN INDIA 
 
The 1992 Constitutional amendment seeks to give panchayats a new meaning and a 
fresh lease of life. The basic features of the amendment are as follows: 
 
1. Article 243G defines panchayats as institutions of self-government 
meaning that they have the autonomy and power to govern in an exclusive 
area of jurisdiction. 
2. The amendment defines the role of panchayats as instruments of economic 
development and social justice. Incidentally, earlier there was confusion 
about the role of panchayats. Thus this clarification through constitutional 
amendment is significant. 
3. The amendment requires States to hold panchayat elections through the 
State Election Commission at regular intervals of five years. If a State 
Government dissolves a panchayat before the expiry of its full term, it is 
mandatory on the part of the State Government concerned, to hold election 
within six months from the date of dissolution. 
4. The Act provides for the reservation of one-third seats and posts of 
chairpersons for women and weaker sections, i.e., Scheduled Caste (SC) 
Scheduled Tribe ( ST). 
5. According to the provisions of the Constitutional amendment the State 
Government shall constitute State Finance Commission, which will review 
the financial position and recommend the principles for fund devolution on 
PRIs and the distribution of funds between the State Government and the 
PRIs. 
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CHALLENGES TO THE THIRD GENERATION PANCHAYATI RAJ IN 
INDIA.  
 
The MP Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme 
Under this scheme a sum of Rs. 1,580 crores per year is placed at the disposal of 
the MPs. The MPs are allowed to spend the money to undertake local area 
development schemes outside the purview of panchayats and municipalities. In this 
way the constitutionally mandated local government institutions are 
bypassed.Under the scheme each MP can suggest to the District Collector works 
worth up to Rs. 2 crores in a year. The Ministry releases the funds directly to the 
Collectors who get the works done on the advice of the concerned MP. 
 
The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (2001) showed that the 
scheme was plagued not only by the inadequacy of funds but also by the increasing 
underutilization, misuse and diversion of money earmarked for the project. Most of 
the plans undertaken form part of the 11
th
 and 12
th
 Schedules incorporated in the 
73
rd
 and 74
th
 Amendments of the Constitution which clearly refer to the functions 
that are to be transferred to the local bodies. The Report noted that out of Rs. 5018 
crores only Rs. 3221 i.e. 64 per cent of the released amount could be spent. Also, 
the release of funds was not linked to their end-use, with utilization certificates 
being received for only 29.78% of the projects taken up and completed by the 
implementing agency. While during 1993- 97, 89% of the work sanctioned by the 
collector was taken up, only 56.13% of it could actually be completed. The 
corresponding percentages further declined to 86.41% and 39.42% respectively 
during 1997- 2000. This was due to the fact that the Ministry often released funds 
without any co-relation with the end use and it did not insist on the utilization 
certificates from the implementing agencies. 
 
Similarly, the findings of the sample study of audit in 106 constituencies 
found that out of total expenditure of Rs.265 crores reported by the Collectors, a 
sum of Rs. 82 crores, that is, 31 per cent of the total money was, in fact, not spent 
at all. The guidelines seem to have been observed more in their breach. In 
Nagaland, for example, the money was spent for building roads connecting the 
Church, in Orissa temples were built, in Madhya Pradesh money was spent for 
building housing complex for the police officials.
5
 
 
The Centre for Budget and Governance (CBGA), 2004 in its report titled The 
Rhetoric and Reality of MPLADS reviews the working of the said scheme in seven 
constituencies spread across six Indian states- Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and Orissa. The report holds the members of both the 
houses of Indian Parliament responsible for the underutilization of funds. While 
Lok Sabha members (till 2003) have used only 77% of their total entitlement, the 
amount used by the Rajya Sabha members has not exceeded 50%. The report also 
studied the scheme‟s beneficiaries across six states. The overall picture that 
emerges is that a lion‟s share of the MPLAD funds is spent in a top- down manner 
without taking into consideration people‟s actual needs. Beneficiaries also alleged 
that they were paid much less than the specified minimum wages in employment 
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works under the scheme and an overwhelming number (62%) agreed that the 
quality of assets created was either bad or very bad. 
 
Even in the face of widespread public criticism of the administrative and 
financial mismanagement of funds under MPLADS, continued recommendations 
for the abolition of MPLADS even by the Administrative Reforms Committee 
(ARC) in its successive reports have failed to produce any positive impact. As 
most of the MPs openly expressed their unwillingness on the floor of the 
Parliament to give up the scheme, it was finally decided to continue the scheme but 
with new and stringent safeguards. As a result, a set of new guidelines was framed 
in the middle of November, 2005. Several legal and constitutional experts have 
dubbed the new Guidelines as ‘unconstitutional’ on the ground that they defy and 
distort some of the basic features of the constitution such as public audit. For 
instance, the attempt to do away with a CAG (Comptroller and Auditor General 
)audit of the scheme accounts, as stated in the guidelines, is actually an attempt to 
disempower the Parliament in exercising control over public expenditure. 
Moreover, the list of permissible works under the scheme still contains items such 
as roads, sanitation, drinking water, education and public health that form a part of 
the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules of the constitution meant for the PRIs.
6
 
 
 
Legislative Inadequacies and Absence of Enabling Rules and Orders  
 
Although the Seventy Third Amendment of the constitution aims primarily at 
offering certainty, continuity and strength to the panchayats, inadequacies in the 
drafting of legislation have created only a set of paper laws for them. In most of the 
cases the laws fail to reflect the spirit of the CAA (Constitutional Amendment Act) 
and even where they do, they cannot be effectively implemented for want of 
enabling rules and orders. The main lacuna of the CAA, however, is that instead of 
clearly specifying the powers and functions of the panchayats, it has left it to the 
whim of state governments. It is clearly evident in Article 243(G) which states that 
the state legislature may, by law, endow panchayats with such powers and 
authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self 
government. The repeated usage of the word „may‟ in the article fails to make it 
mandatory on the part of the state government to implement these provisions, thus 
leaving power-sharing with the state government solely at the disposal of the 
political leadership at the state level. This explains the varying degrees in the 
performance of panchayats across different states. 
 
It is pertinent to note here that the constitution spells out the functions of the 
PRIs in very broad terms - in most cases covering the entire possible expanse of a 
subject without clearly indicating specific items of responsibility, activities or sub- 
activities under the broad functions.
7
 In line with the irregularities in the Central 
Act, the statutes governing PRIs in the states while devolving functions to the 
panchayats continue to word them generally without detailing out functional 
responsibilities of each tier of panchayats for each of the subjects. 
 
Mere legal enactments are not enough unless they are backed by enabling 
rules and orders. Even in states where conformity legislation has been enacted rules 
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and bye-laws for their day-today functioning are yet to be formulated. In the 
absence of necessary operational laws, the states are often found to misinterpret the 
provisions of delegated legislation as a device for deferring legislation. In 
Rajasthan, for example, the whole range of powers and functions that have been 
legally assigned to the PRIs are either made subject to „such rules as may be 
prescribed‟ or „to the extent and in the manner as may be prescribed‟ and since 
then no rules have been framed or orders/ guidelines issued to this effect. 
 
 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes  
 
The creation of a large number of programmes (more than 200 schemes currently) 
called centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) sponsored by the Union Ministries has 
posed a serious challenge to democratic decentralization by distorting the 
multilevel planning process and inter governmental transfer arrangements within 
the federal set up. This is mainly because many of the subjects they deal with are 
either included in the State list or the „local list‟ mentioned in the 11th and 12th 
schedules. The share of the CSSs in the plan budget of the federal government has 
shot up to 70 per cent against less than 30 per cent in the early 1980s. Besides the 
CSSs there are also 26 sectoral programmes falling under the 29 subjects of the 
11
th
 Schedule which the central ministries handle. The schemes are drawn up at the 
centre and implemented at the local level. The association of local bodies with the 
implementation processes does not really serve the purpose because the 
implementing bodies only implement according to the rules laid down elsewhere. 
The local government has to accept them because the centre has financial clout. 
 
 
Undermining Elections 
 
Attempts to undermine elections for panchayats continues. Some of the states have 
taken years to hold elections. Postponing elections under one pretext or another has 
become a routine matter. The elections to panchayats have been completed in 
almost all the states after a series of legal battles and interventions by civil society 
organizations. The case of Orissa is interesting. Elections to PRIs were due to be 
held  before February 2002. The SEC had promptly intimated the state government 
its preparedness to conduct elections on time and suggested a delimitation of wards 
and reservation of seats beforehand, if required. The district magistrates had in fact 
done the work and the state government had ordered a limited delimitation of seats 
in consonance with the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964. To cause further delay 
in this regard the state government brought a bill in the monsoon session for the 
reservation of seats in favour of the OBCs. The SEC chose to file a case in the 
High Court. At this stage the state government decided to hold elections.
8
 
 
Gujarat has recently set a unique example. The State Government has 
announced incentives to the extent of Rs. 1 lakh to those panchayats, which would 
be able to hold elections on the basis of consensus. The scheme called samras 
gram (harmonious village) is clearly anti-democratic and is regarded as a recipe for 
reward-induced guided democracy.  
 
Interestingly, what is happening in some states in the name of achieving 
unanimity is a cause of serious concern. During the panchayat elections in 
Karnataka in 2000 some of the seats were auctioned. The Election Commission 
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could not interfere on the ground that if the voters made an arrangement among 
themselves to ensure unanimous election it was beyond the legal competence of the 
Commission to intervene. In order to augment the resources some of the seats were 
put up for bidding in Andhra Pradesh in 2001. Even the reserved seats were not 
spared. The highest amount for the post of the Sarpanch in Velpur village under 
Guntur district was 10.10 lakh. Seats are auctioned in Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan. In 2005, auctions were held for the post of Sarpanch in at least two 
gram panchayats .In Rajasthan it was the caste factor which mattered most. The 
panchayat dominated by Gujjars was reserved for the SCs. Disturbed by the sudden 
loss of power, some of the influential Gujjar leaders decided to extract a price for 
the post. An announcement for open sale was made at the village Chaupal assuring 
unanimous election of the highest bidder. The auction took place two weeks before 
the day of polling. The reserved price was fixed at Rs.50, 000. One person offered 
Rs.2.7 lakh and the seat was allotted to him. However, the effort proved to be 
abortive due to intervention by the District Collector who got three of them 
arrested.
9
 
 
There was large scale distribution of gifts and allurements offered by 
candidates in the UP elections held in 2005, some of them financed by non-resident 
Indian relatives. There was a free flow of money and liquor in many villages. Hand 
pumps were installed outside each house in one of the villages and voters in one of 
the villages received silver rings and glasses. A candidate in one village called 
Pratapgarh promised gold rings to each woman in the GP if he won. In several 
constituencies whisky bottles were distributed liberally. There was hardly any 
serious candidate who did not exceed the expenditure ceiling fixed by the SEC. 
The local newspapers were splashed with advertisements by the well-to-do 
candidates.
10
  
 
It is interesting to note that the holding of elections at regular intervals can 
bring about significant change in the socio-political profile of rural India.
11
 Studies 
have shown that the caste system in Tamil Nadu has weakened following the 
elections. 
 
 
Devolution in the Conformity Legislations. 
 
The 73
rd
 Amendment of the Constitution of India stipulates the transfer of powers 
and functions to panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) as a part of the decentralization 
process. The State Governments were supposed to transfer 29 subjects listed in the 
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. While the states like Kerala, Karnataka and 
West Bengal have carved out a clear path of devolution to PRIs, other states like 
Rajasthan, Maharastra, Gujarat and Bihar have variations in their initiatives in this 
regard. States like Haryana, Uttar Pradesh have still to set the ball rolling. As per 
the information available in November 2006, only eight states and one Union 
territory have formally transferred all the 29 functions or subjects to PRIs.
12
 The 
Working Group on the Decentralised Planning observes, “...... items listed as 
responsibilities in the states are couched in vague terms. A glance at the variety of 
these items reveals that they are a shopping list of sectors and sub-sectors, broad 
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activities in a sub-sector and activities, sub-activities/specific responsibilities under 
a broad activity, with no role clarity.... In some states the line departments still 
exercise the powers of supervision and control over the scheme of subjects 
transferred to the panchayats” The Parliamentary Committee in its 37th report 
submitted in 2003 has expressed concern over the pace at which states are working 
in this direction. The Report of the Task Force on the Devolution of Powers and 
Functions to the PRIs brought out by the Ministry of Rural Development has 
admitted that the mandatory provisions of the 73
rd
 Amendment Act are yet to be 
implemented in letter and spirit by most of the states/UTs even eight years after the 
said Act came into force in April, 1993”. The conformity legislations of most of 
the States have not significantly altered the functional domain of gram panchayats 
as is shown in the Table No.1. The studies emphasize the need for a uniform 
accounting system and a uniform grant structure to ensure transparency in the 
functional transfers to the rural local bodies. 
 
 
Table No.1 
Sl. No. States/UTs 
No. of Departments/subjects Transferred to 
Panchayats with 
  a ) Funds b) Functions c) Functionaries 
1. Andhra Pradesh 5 17 2 
2. Arunachal Pradesh - - - 
3. Assam - 29 - 
4. Bihar - 20 - 
5. Jharkhand - - - 
6. Goa 6 6 - 
7. Gujarat 15 15 15 
8. Haryana *  - 
9. Himachal Pradesh 2 26   
10. Karnataka 29 29 29 
11. Kerala 15 26 15 
12. Madhya Pradesh 10 23 9 
13. Chhattisgarh 10 29 9 
14. Maharashtra 18 18 18 
15. Manipur - 22 4 
16. Orissa 5 25 21 
17. Punjab - 7 - 
18. Rajasthan - 16 - 
19. Sikkim 24 24 24 
20. Tamil Nadu - 29 - 
21. Tripura - 12 - 
22. Uttar Pradesh 12 13 9 
23. Uttranchal - 11 11 
24. West Bengal 12 29 12 
25. A&N Islands 6 6 6 
26. Chandigarh - - - 
27. D&N Haveli - 3 3 
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28. Daman & Diu 5 9 3 
29. NCT Delhi **   *** 
30. Pondicherry - - - 
31. Lakshadweep - 6 - 
 
* 
 
Almost all the 29 subjects 
** Panchayati Raj System is yet to be revived. 
*** No functionary has been transferred. However, GPs and ZPs have been 
made the appointing authorities with regard to 9 functions on contract basis.  
  
Note: Provisions of the Constitution (73
rd
 Amendment) Act, 1992 are not 
applicable to the States of J&K, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.  
Source: Government of India (2001b) 
 
 
The preambles of only three conformity legislations viz. those of Bihar, West 
Bengal and Tripura unequivocally mention that the objective of the panchayat 
legislations is to endow panchayats with functions and powers so as to enable them 
to function as vibrant institutions of self government. The Acts of Tamil Nadu, 
Kerala, Sikkim, UP and Maharastra make some commitment to self-government. 
The Haryana Act spells out that the panchayat system is meant for better 
administration of rural areas. Similarly, the MP Act treats janpad panchayat ( 
middle tier ) only as an agent of the government. Other states like Karnataka, 
Punjab, Goa, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur have carefully refrained from making 
any specific commitment to self government for their panchayats.  
 
The lack of clarity in functional allocation and absence of disaggregation into 
detailed activities, as the Panchayati Raj Development Report 1995 mentions, has 
led to considerable overlapping and duality of control in most cases. It has been 
argued in the report that functional autonomy is rendered difficult because in 
almost all states, the state governments retain the power to assign, amend or 
withhold functions which, as per the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution, is a job 
only the state governments are authorized to do. 
 
More recently, however, the Government of India decided in favour of 
undertaking activity mapping to ensure effective devolution of functions (as listed 
in the Schedule XI) to all the three tiers of the PRIs. This is indeed a welcome 
move whereby every activity can be attributed to the appropriate level of panchayat 
so as to enable a more effective delivery of public services and a better quality of 
life for the citizens. Devolution of powers, (as declared in the First Round Table of 
Ministers- in- Charge of Panchayati Raj, Kolkata, July 2004) was to be based on 
the principle of subsidiarity which means that “any task that can be done at the 
lower level should not move to a higher level.” 
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Table No. 2 
 
State/ UT No. of 
Subjects 
transferred 
Details of AM (Activity 
Mapping undertaken) 
Notes 
Andhra Pradesh 17 9 AM for critical subjects like housing not done. Only 8 depts. have passed 
orders for transfer of funds and functionaries. 
Arunachal Pradesh - 29   
Assam 29 29   
Bihar 25 -   
Chhattisgarh 29 27* Executive orders not issued 
Goa 6 18 18 functions devolved to GPs, 6 to ZPs 
Gujarat 15 14 Only 5 subjects partially devolved 
Haryana - 10 Subjects yet to be transferred 
Himachal Pradesh 26 - 15 departments have issued orders delegating powers to panchayats 
Karnataka 29 29 AM implemented through fiscal devolution in 2005-06 budget with 
regard to 26 subjects 
Kerala 26 26 119 activities relating to 19 functions devolved. AM has been revised 
with complete details. 
Madhya Pradesh 23 7 AM prepared by an NGO, Samarthan. Yet to be considered by 
government. 
Maharashtra 18 - No move to undertake AM 
Manipur 22 22  
Orissa 25 7 Fiscal transfer yet to be made 
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Punjab 7 - Draft AM prepared 
Rajasthan 29 12 AM done for agriculture, soil conservation,   PHED, elementary and 
secondary education, health and family welfare, irrigation, forest, 
industry, food, tourism, PWD, energy, technical education 
Sikkim 28 -   
Tamil Nadu 29  Instructions issued for devolving all subjects to panchayats but no actual 
devolution 
Tripura 29 21 Orders were issued for the devolution of 21 subjects in 1994 
Uttar Pradesh 12 - AM completed in respect of 32 departments. implementation yet to take 
place 
Uttaranchal 14 9 Orders for devolution of 3 departments issued 
West Bengal 29 15 Orders issued in respect of 15 subjects for which AM has been completed 
A & N Islands     
D & N Haveli 3  AM completed 
Lakshadweep - -   
Chandigarh - -   
 
* (Except forest and drinking water supply) 
 
Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India 
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Transfer of Funds 
The transfer of functions without corresponding transfer of funds does not make 
sense but this has nevertheless, happened. Mahi Pal rightly says that before listing 
the functions to be performed by the panchayats, the states have introduced certain 
qualifying clauses.
13
 In Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Tamil Nadu it is “within the 
limits of its funds”. In Punjab “it is to the extent its funds allow to perform”. In 
Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, it is “as far as the gram panchayat funds at 
its disposal”. 
 
A close examination of the provisions in the Acts of the different states 
regarding tax assignments, tax sharing, non- tax revenues makes it very clear that 
the PRIs at the level of the samiti and parishad do not have independent taxing 
powers. Most of the taxes are assigned at the GP levels.A provision for 
independent budgeting by the three tiers is another prime requisite to ensure 
autonomy. In some states like Andhra Pradesh and Orissa for PS, Punjab for ZP, 
Rajasthan for PS and ZP, Tamil Nadu for all tiers, the preparation and presentation 
of budgets is left to the executive authority rather than to elected representatives. 
 
The Constitution provides for setting up of the State Finance Commission 
(SFCs). By mid –1990s the first SFCs had submitted their reports. Referring to the 
role of the SFCs the mid-term appraisal of the Ninth Plan pointed out, “more 
buoyant taxes like sales tax and excise are kept out of the purview of the PRIs. All 
SFCs have put great emphasis on internal revenue mobilisation but none has 
suggested any effective mechanism for PRIs to generate their revenue..... Indeed, 
the absence of attention to the elementary principle, that expenditure assignment 
must precede any tax or revenue assignment, has made most of the SFC‟s 
recommendations suspect”14 The State Governments have also been slow and 
hesitant in accepting the recommendations where they are useful in terms of 
improving the revenue generation capacity of the local bodies. Only two states – 
Karnataka and Sikkim – have devolved funds to the panchayats for the 29 subjects. 
In some states several of the basic services which traditionally belonged to the 
panchayats like street lighting, provision of drinking water supply, sanitation and 
drainage, primary health care etc. have not been entrusted to the GPs. For example, 
in Haryana, GPs practically deal with only drinking water and construction and 
maintenance of roads to the exclusion of all other basic services.  
 
The balance sheets of panchayats reflect either financial scarcity or a lack of 
control over budgeted finance. Except for a few states where the panchayats have 
access to some funds, the financial position of the PRIs is in a bad shape. 
Panchayat finances are fragile in most states where the total receipts of tax revenue 
is only 3.5 per cent from 1997-98 in the 15 select states. It is about 5 per cent in 
Orissa, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Haryana and 
between 10 per cent and 20 per cent in Assam, Goa and Kerala.
15
 
 
PRIs across the states do not have any control over their own physical and 
human resources. The SFCs have recommended the transfer of those powers, 
which are less effective, although there has been emphasis on internal resource 
mobilisation. This is a matter of concern because embedded in the question of 
financial viability is the issue of self - reliance. The financial autonomy ratio 
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 The Status of PR Finances in India, PRIA New Delhi, 1999 
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(FAR) for the selected Gram Panchayats (GPs) is below 1 per cent, indicating 
almost total dependence on the grants from the higher-level governments. Even in 
the states like Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra, the 
FAR of the selected GPs is not more than 50 per cent. In Kerala perhaps the best 
performing state in terms devolution to local bodies, the own revenue of an average 
GP is only 33 per cent. 
 
A study of 15 select states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana, Assam, Goa reveals 
that where middle or top tiers have been constituted, states have not endowed them 
with adequate functional responsibility. Most states have granted a plethora of 
functional responsibilities but no executive follow up of granting adequate powers, 
staff and financial resources. Except for four major states where the intermediate 
and apex bodies have adequate staff, in most other states, either the staff is not 
directly relevant or inadequate. A study of panchayats in 15 states done by the 
National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, shows that the political 
parties are reluctant to devolve powers.  Jean Dreze has shown that in most States 
the main responsibility of a sarpanch is to oversee the implementation of 
development programmes.
16
 
 
The Kolkata conference of ministers in-charge of the departments of 
panchayats and rural developments in different states, held in July 2004, reaffirmed 
its commitment to the best traditions of fiscal federalism in which the Union and 
the states would co-operate to strengthen local government finances. It was agreed 
to develop a framework of co-operation between Union Government and the state 
government and to devise a mechanism, but nothing significant has emerged so far. 
 
 
Transfer of Functionaries 
 
To function effectively as institutions of self government the PRIs need to have the 
power to recruit and control staff required for managing its functions. Staff is a 
resource that an organization must possess to perform its activities. Strangely, Part 
IX and IXA of the Indian constitution remain silent on this vital aspect of 
institutional autonomy. Viewed from this perspective the state panchayat 
legislations too present a gloomy picture. The state governments still have retained 
for themselves the power for inspection, inquiring into the affairs of the 
panchayats, the suspension of panchayat resolutions and issuing directions. Besides 
in most states the key functionaries, namely, the secretaries and executive officers 
at all the three levels of panchayats are state government employees who are 
appointed, transferred and controlled by the state government. Being under the 
direct control of the state administrative hierarchy they are often reluctant to work 
under the administrative control of the elected panchayats. Moreover, provisions 
for the deputation of officials from the state government to the panchayats have 
been made in the state panchayat acts without consultation with the panchayats. 
The tenure, transfer and the promotion of deputationists are also decided by the 
state government without consulting the panchayats. 
 
Kerala is the only state which has completely transferred the control of 
functionaries to panchayats. More than 100 officials of different line departments 
have been devolved to district panchayat which exercise supervisory and 
administrative control over these functionaries.  Only two states – Karnataka and 
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Sikkim – have transferred functionaries pertaining to all the 29 subjects to the 
panchayats. But in Karnataka too the panchayats have no power of recruitment, 
transfer and discipline over their staff. Here, the zilla parishads and the taluka 
panchayats are filled with state government officials resulting in dual loyalties and 
needless friction in the day-to-day functioning of the panchayats. Although in a 
few states the GPs have been given the power to recruit and control their own staff, 
this power remains largely unutilized due to the weak financial position of the GPs. 
States like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
Chandigarh and Pondicherry have not transferred any functionaries to the 
panchayats. The rest of the states and Union Territories have transferred 
functionaries of some departments/ subjects to the panchayats ranging from 2 in 
Andhra Pradesh and 18 in Maharashtra. But even in states where the process has 
just been initiated the efforts seem to be half-hearted. In Maharashtra, for instance, 
this has led to role confusion as the transfer has not been made for the entire staff 
of respective departments. Instead, they are being shared between the line 
departments and the panchayats. Nilkant Rath has pointed out that this has 
complicated the role of the Twelfth Finance Commission which has been asked to 
recommend measures for the augmentation of the resources of the local bodies in 
light of the recommendations of the SFCs.
17
 
 
 
Administrative Autonomy of the PRIs 
 
In addition to what has been stated above relating to the lack of control by the PRIs 
over their staff, most state Acts arm themselves with omnibus clauses and penal 
provisions which make administrative autonomy of the PRIs a mockery. For 
example, it has been laid down in the Rajasthan act that the state government shall 
be the chief superintendent and controlling authority in respect of all matters to 
PRIs. Interestingly, according to the provisions of the Act if a panchayat fails to 
perform its duty, it will be given time to do so and, if it fails again the work will be 
given to an agency at the cost of the panchayat. In Orissa the collector can direct 
any officer to attend any meeting of the GP. If the collector is of the opinion that 
the GP is unable to discharge its functions, he may direct the PS to function on 
behalf of the GP.  
 
 
People's Participation: The Gram Sabhas 
 
As an institution of direct democracy, it may be recalled that Rajni Kothari has 
visualized the role of the Gram Sabhas in the following words: 
 
"Representative bodies have their inherent dynamics of power politics and 
willy-nilly end up vesting effective authority in the politician-bureaucracy 
nexus. The only way of making this nexus responsible and accountable is to 
provide larger citizen involvement in new variants of old institutions like the 
Gram Sabha which can combine older forms of informal consensus- making 
mechanisms with the more formal, institutionalized and legal forms decreed 
by legislations. With the new awakening in rural areas these bodies have the 
potential to oversee the working of elected bodies and over time, with the 
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growing confidence that they cannot be brow-beaten by dominant individuals 
or castes, they become a force to reckon with."
18
 
 
The Ashok Mehta committee observed that "the gram sabha has an important 
role in activating the democratic process at the grassroot level, in inculcating 
community spirit, in increasing political awareness and enabling the weaker 
sections to progressively assert their point of view" Gram sabha is useful not only 
as vigilance mechanism in the hands of the people but also as a tool to restore the 
lost credibility of the panchayat in India. 
 
Gram Sabha literally means village meeting – a meeting of the villagers to 
discuss their common problems. In many ways, it is comparable to a citizens‟ 
forum, a forum of direct democracy, which existed in Greek city states.
19
 
 
While the constitution makes it mandatory to establish Gram Sabha at the village 
level, it does not stipulate any details regarding the structure, powers, and functions 
of this institution. In terms of Article 243G these details are to be spelt out in the 
panchayati raj legislations passed in each state in compliance with the 73rd 
amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, all the state governments have 
provided for the institution of gram sabha in their respective panchayat legislations. 
There are variations across the states with regard to composition, functions and 
other matters. In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka the Gram Sabha has been defined 
in relation to revenue village, whereas in Maharashtra and Rajasthan the unit is 
much larger and coterminous with the village panchayat. In Kerala there is Gram 
Sabha for every ward. 
 
None of the State Acts empowers the GS to have control over the GP and to 
take final decisions in matters of village development. Its role is only advisory. The 
accountability of the GP to this body has also not been clearly spelt out in most of 
the state legislations. In Kerala, however, it is obligatory on the part of the head of 
the GP to explain to the GS why a particular decision or a set of decisions could 
not be implemented. 
 
In most of the states the functional domain of the GS is limited to discussions 
of annual statement of accounts, administration report, and selection of 
beneficiaries for anti-poverty programmes. Only in a few states like Haryana, 
Punjab and Tamil Nadu the GSs enjoy the powers to approve budgets. The Gram 
Sabhas are yet to take off in almost all the states.
20
 Reports from the states indicate 
that Gram Sabha meetings are not being held regularly. The Institute of Social 
Sciences team found in a village in Madhya Pradesh (MP) that by December 
1995,only three meetings were held as against the legal requirement of six 
meetings.  
 
Nirmala Buch conducted a study of Gram Sabhas in 11 Gram Panchayats in 
MP in December 1997 and found that far from an adequate number of GS 
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members attending the meetings not even all the panchs were present.
21
 To cap it 
all, there was no quorum of more than 50 per cent in the GS meetings. There is a 
provision for mandatory attendance of one-tenth members in the Gram Sabha. 
Women find it difficult to attend as the timing is sometime in the forenoon i.e. 
between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. Most of the women are not aware even of the 
rudiments of the Gram Sabha. The issues discussed do not seem to interest a large 
number of the villagers and hence, except careful and knowledgeable stakeholders, 
others shy away from the Gram Sabha. 
 
A study conducted in two Panchayats in Kerala has shown that the people are in 
favour of expanding the role of the Gram Sabhas.
22.
They want the Gram Sabhas to 
give the final seal of approval to the activities of the Gram Panchayat. The people 
interviewed have suggested that the Gram Sabha will perform its duties in time 
provided people are made aware of its role in development activities. Once their 
felt needs are taken into consideration, they will automatically attend the meetings 
in large numbers and participate effectively in the activities of the Gram 
Panchayats. 
 
In some of the States Gram Sabha meetings are generating a new atmosphere 
in the countryside. Social auditing at the Gram Sabha meetings has also started 
yielding desirable results. The Gram Sabha meeting in Karnataka successfully 
combated the time-honoured Devdasi system, which prevailed in 167 villages of 
Belgaun district.
23
 The UMA Research team of Bangalore had witnessed a Gram 
Sabha meeting at Indore Gram Panchayat in Uttar Kanada district.
24
 The Sabha 
witnessed uproarious scene when the people demanded an explanation from the 
secretary about the activities. Only a handful of members were familiar with the 
Act. The presence of the women members was very insignificant and those who 
did come were passive observers. Many were hesitant to confront the elected 
representatives. Most of the questions were raised by the youth. The elders hardly 
opened their lips. 
 
The Participatory Research in Asia team studied the working of the Gram 
Sabhas in Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh.
25
 The 
team has noticed that although meetings are being held almost regularly, a quorum 
is hardly achieved. Surprisingly, despite the lack of quorum, the proceedings are 
prepared. The team is generally of the opinion that there is a lack of awareness on 
the part of the members not only about the time and venue of the meetings but also 
about the usefulness of such meetings. 
 
The team points out that except in Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, the advice and 
suggestions of the Gram Sabha are not even binding to the Gram Panchayat. In 
reality, Gram Sabha meetings do not serve the purpose of either establishing 
village priorities and overall policy framework for Gram Panchayat or regular 
monitoring and accountability of the resources and the decisions of the Gram 
Panchayats. 
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The scholars observe that most of the heads of the panchayats lack skills in 
conducting meetings in a manner that could promote wider participation and 
discussion of the issues affecting the village. Issues of social justice and internal 
dynamics of the village have rarely been agenda items in the Gram Sabha 
meetings. 
 
An authoritative survey of panchayati raj by NIRD reports follows: almost all 
the State Acts have provided for Gram Sabha but its functions have not been spelt 
out in detail. Consequently, these institutions by and large continue to function 
ineffectively, though the meetings are generally held as prescribed. The purpose is 
hardly served in the absence of a clear and direct mandate. More often, there is a 
tendency to conduct the meetings in a formal manner and finalize the proceedings 
in haste. The prescribed quorum is also not given due importance. The absence of 
women folk in the meetings has been a common feature. The participation of the 
people belonging to the weaker section has been marginal. 
 
In West Bengal, the Gram Sabha created by an amendment of the West 
Bengal Panchayat Act in 1992, started working well. Webster‟s research 
demonstrated that apart from the compulsory meetings of the Gram Sabha, the 
informal mighty discussions in some localities, regular public meetings were other 
forms of participation.
26
 Lieten remarked that although the boktrita culture was not 
altogether absent in the Gram Sabha meetings, participation used to take place.
27 
  
In other words although the leaders used to deliver long speeches, they did not 
stand in the way of active participation of the villagers in the meetings. Around 
one- fourth of the males he spoke to, stated that they had participated in meetings. 
In West Bengal, there is another body called Gram Sansad the geographical 
location of which is the electoral constituency of the members of the GP. 
According to the available information and the findings of the studies the Gram 
Sansad meetings are attended by people of all age groups. In most of the meetings, 
the Gram Panchayats publish the reports. There had been many occasions when the 
meetings generated lot of heat. The author himself witnessed a situation where a 
group of members walked out when the Pradhan refused to concede their demand. 
The formation of the beneficiary committee had been more often than not an issue 
of debate and discussion. This body is now replaced by the Gram Unnayan samity. 
There is still a lack of awareness on the part of the Pradhan and the members about 
the legal provisions relating to the Gram Sansad and Gram Sabha meetings. This 
has been the finding of another study done in Gujarat.
28
 The officials present in the 
meeting have to correct them. 
 
The study done by the author reveals that more than one third of the villagers 
are not aware of the Gram Sansad.
29
 The reactions of the respondents tend to show 
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that there are three reasons for the low attendance of the members in the meetings, 
namely, lack of time, the general impression that the decisions are not taken in the 
meetings and the reluctance on the part of a section of the Gram Panchayat 
members to listen to the suggestions generated during the meetings. The studies 
done by the author indicate that the meetings have been more successful in places 
where the GPs and the parties have taken an initiative in synchronising them with 
the cultural programmes in tune with local traditions. It is clear from the 
experience of functioning of the Gram Sansads that the modern institutional 
assemblies like Gram Sabhas and Gram Sansads in traditional societies like India 
need to be tuned with the natural rhythm of the rural life. 
 
A study of the functioning of Gram Sansad in a cross-section of 20 villages in 
May 1999 brings out certain important issues.
30
 The study shows that in analysing 
the occupational category of the voters who attended the meetings, the largest 
single category was agricultural labourers followed by farmers with less than two 
acres of land. Those with more land or with non-farming sources of income 
constituted about 16 per cent of those present. The analysis of the study‟s findings 
tends to show that the meetings were centred upon very practical and concrete 
problems within the village or cluster of villages. Proposals for road repair, where 
should a tube well be installed, who should receive loan are more common issues 
as opposed to broader themes which political parties, trade unions or peasant 
organizations in West Bengal are concerned with, such as, economic liberalisation, 
privatisation of public sector. In quite a few meetings, though not in all, the 
accounts of the previous year and the budgets for the next year for the entire Gram 
Sansad area were also placed. The researchers have noticed that the participants 
actively voice demands for new projects, suggest how allocated funds should be 
spent and debate how projects should be designed. The Pradhans and the local 
representatives are not spared. They have to answer a lot of questions and often 
face allegations about the misuse of funds and selection of beneficiaries. The 
responses of the panchayat leaders to the criticisms indicate that they could not 
take the voters present in the meetings for granted. There had been occasions when 
they had to make frank admission about their errors. 
 
 
Women Empowerment 
 
In order to add a new dimension to the process of democratic decentralization, 
namely, gender justice, the 73
rd
 amendment of the Constitution provides for the 
reservation of seats and the posts of chairpersons for women. All the state Acts 
have incorporated this provision and elections are being held accordingly. But the 
studies indicate that women elected to PRIs are yet to play their roles properly.
31
 
Conceptually it indicates a shift of attitude of the state towards women. Earlier 
women were generally viewed as objects of development. The amendment seeks to 
make women, actors in development. 
 
This is a historic step, a sharp break from the previous practice. As many as 50 
countries world over have quotas for women for their legislative bodies. Of the 20 
countries with the largest number of women in parliament, 17 are using quotas in 
some form or other. However, following this amendment the number of elected 
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women at the GP level has gone up to 35.92 per cent of the total numbers of the 
elected representatives. At the taluk panchayat level the figure is 40.14 per cent. 
Again at the ZP level, the total number of women members elected is 39.37 per 
cent. Some states elect more women than the one third mandated by the 
amendment. For example, Maharashtra and Karnataka have 43.7 per cent and 43 
per cent women respectively in their village councils. In 2004 there were at least 
nine states where there was more than 33 per cent women in PRIs, Andhra Pradesh 
( 33.04) Assam ( 50.38) , Chattisgarh ( 33.75) , Gujarat ( 49.30 ), Kerala ( 57.24 ), 
Karnataka ( 43.06) Tamil Nadu ( 36.73), Uttar Pradesh ( 37.85), West Bengal 
35.15) Bihar has made a provision for 50 per cent reservation. Women are getting 
elected from general seats as well.  
 
 
Findings from Some Cross-State Studies 
 
Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) studied women leadership in Panchayats in 
six states.
32
 The profile of the elected women leaders as brought out by the studies 
is given below:  
 Majority of them are in the age-group of 35-45 years  
 The proportion of unmarried women is negligible  
 Only 20 to 40 per cent of the women are literate  
 Incidence of joint and nuclear families is almost equal  
 Less than 20 per cent of them are heads of the domestic households  
 About 40 per cent of the members work in the field  
 The educational and economic background of the chairpersons are better 
than those of ordinary members  
 More than 20 per cent come from the families of past Panchayati Raj 
members  
 About 40 per cent stood for elections on the insistence of their husbands 
and 20 per cent on that of the community (caste) etc.  
 25 per cent notice change in their status in the family after having elected  
 About 60 per cent would like to encourage women to contest elections  
 About 60 of these elected would contest next elections  
 
Gram Panchayat meetings in the cases where women Pradhans are effective, have a 
presence of women members and a higher-level participation of members. 
Concerns of women in Gram Sabha meetings get discussed and more schemes and 
programmes related to women find their way into the Panchayats. These trends are 
visible in all the states. 
 
The women Pradhans have been able to establish linkages with the block level 
government functionaries as well as the Panchayat Samiti. Initially they had some 
problems due to lack of proper exposure. Later on, their confidence increased as 
they continued to interact with them. 
 
Several significant facts have emerged from a nation-wide study on elected 
women representatives conducted by ORG-Marg for the Union Ministry of 
panchayati raj. It is found that elected women members are generally younger than 
their male counterparts. Educationally, women lag behind men. Reservations have 
been found to be an important motivator for contesting the first elections. 43 per 
cent of the representatives did not receive any training. Interaction with local 
bureaucracy, officials in the line departments and police was found to be less 
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among the female representatives. A sizeable section of the female representatives 
perceive enhancement in their self-esteem, confidence and decision-making ability. 
Becoming a member or Pradhan augments respect within the four walls of families 
well as in the community at large. They also report an increased voice in decisions 
on economic matters as well as other issues in their families.
33
 
 
Nirmala Buch did a study on women‟s experience in Panchayats in three 
states, namely, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
34
 The study has 
indicated that the level of participation of women is very high, though not similar 
to that of men. Women‟s attendance in the panchayat meetings ranged from 55.5 
per cent to 74.4 per cent as against the men‟s average attendance range of 68.7 per 
cent. A majority of the respondents showed good level of awareness and 
knowledge about the working of the Panchayats. In order to argue their case in the 
meetings many of them take others into confidence and hold informal discussions. 
Empirical studies bring out both “narratives of courage” and “narratives of 
dislocation” that disrupt the presumed outcomes of women‟s political 
representation in PRIs. A field study in the five districts of MP covering 94 out of 
188 sarpanches belonging to SC from the districts of Ujjain, Dewas, Ratlam, 
Shajahanpur and Mandsuar show that women were elected from families who were 
opinion leaders and continued to play their roles from behind the scenes. SC 
members face both caste domination and male domination. 
 
It has been argued by Kumud Sharma that that the language of state politics, 
procedures of political parties for recruitment and nominations and political 
socialization of men and women reflect a conflictual relationship between 
women‟s representation and political leadership. Most of the political parties 
remain institutionalized sites of patriarchal power. Women have to adjust 
themselves to the imperatives of party structures if they are to survive and in doing 
so some of them get co-opted in the process rather than influencing party structures 
and processes. 
 
The issues get further complicated when they are understood within the 
framework of identity politics Women come in with their social and economic 
disadvantages, poverty, illiteracy and dependence on wage labour.
35
 Women 
sarpanches are prevented from completing their terms in office by using no-
confidence motions. Sarkar says that whereas there are  rules as to how no –
confidence motions  have  to be handled, there is no requirement that the reasons 
for seeking a no-confidence motion have to be stated  in clear terms .
36
 
 
 
Dalit Women  
 
As we have seen above in the state-specific case studies, dalit women are facing 
greater difficulties as they are targeted by the upper castes apart from other odds. It 
has been difficult in states like Tamil Nadu to fill the posts of panchayats 
presidents reserved for dalits for three decades. Dalits were prevented from filing 
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nominations. The caste Hindu standpoint is that dalits cannot be panchayat 
presidents because if they get elected they have to show respect to them.
37
 
 
In Tamil Nadu, for example, till August, 2000 as many 96 village panchayat 
Presidents were removed by district collectors, 66 of whom are women. A study 
conducted by the Human Rights Advocacy and Research Foundation has revealed 
that dalit women Presidents are forced to act under the control of the dominant 
caste of the area. Women panchayat members are treated as non- entities. In most 
cases, the Panchayat clerk proves to be a major obstacle. He is invariably male and 
refuses to hand over keys for the panchayat and withholds crucial information. 
 
There is discrimination in the seating arrangements for dalit women. For example, 
in one panchayat in Haryana, all members sit in chairs while the female dalit 
Sarpanch is made to sit on the floor because she belongs to the lower caste. In a 
village called Gundaibhai in Madhya Pradesh the poor of the Panchayat who 
belongs to the lower caste and poor agricultural labourer was not allowed to unfurl 
the national flag. She was beaten up by men for „polluting‟ the sacred national 
flag.
38
 In some election campaigns the name of the husband is displayed more 
prominently than the wife's, even if she is a candidate. In one case when the wife 
won the elections her husband was paraded in the victory procession and she was 
nowhere to be seen. 
 
A woman Panchayat President rarely gets the male vice-president to 
countersign the cheque without some resistance from the latter. When the roles are 
reversed, women vice presidents are forced to sign the cheque even if they disagree 
with the expense. The socio-political dynamics in villages hamper the gender 
equity in governance. The following is a case of harassment in a tribal sarpanch. 
Mishri Devi of Thikri village in Dausas district in Rajasthan was elected to the post 
of sarpanch. The upper class male villagers were unhappy. On August she was 
stopped from saluting the national flag in a public place. The upper caste males 
tried to strip her. In Rajasthan again, a women sarpanch her husband and two other 
family members were abused and injured in an attack by 12 persons. 
 
 
No-Confidence Motions  
 
Ramilaben from Gujarat faced numerous no-confidence motions. She holds 
masters degree in history and was advised by a state minister to join politics. She 
contested the district panchayat elections. She won and became the president of the 
district panchayat and as a result became an object of attack from the very 
beginning because of her being female. The Vice President told her that if she 
would refuse to work under his instructions he would force her to resign within 15 
days. Ramilaben took it as challenge. They then initiated a series of no-confidence 
motions. Each time she emerged victorious. Ultimately the High Court issued a 
ruling that only one no–confidence motion could be brought against the President 
during her tenure. In 1996 as many as 16 writ petitions were filed against her in the 
court and she was suspended on grounds of incompetence. She moved the High 
Court and was re-instated by it. 
 
Parties are yet to accept the role of reservation as a tool of empowerment. The 
interesting case of Adiamma from Karnataka is well known. She was the only 
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woman of the 18 SC members GP in Madya district. The Congress (I) decided to 
back her for the post of President. She got elected. Before the elections she used to 
earn her livelihood by cleaning toilets of the Police Stations and worked as an 
agricultural labourer. But after being elected she began to implement her agenda. 
All encroachments near the local bus stand were cleared and the issue of ration 
cards simplified. Many of the males were alarmed at the performance and tried to 
find fault with her. They conspired against her to make her resign and resorted to 
boycotting panchayat meetings. Three consecutive meetings had to be postponed 
due to a lack of quorum. When nothing worked they moved a no-confidence 
motion. The motion was passed with the support of Congress and Janata Dal. 
 
 
Two Child Norm 
 
Only in eight states viz. Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh (HP), 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra the two child 
norm was seen as a way to regulate family size and thereby contain population 
growth. But this legislative measure has been causing serious concern. Very often 
it is being implemented in an environment of non-equal opportunity. 
 
A study conducted in Andhra Pradesh (AP), Haryana, Madhya Pradesh (MP), 
Orissa and Rajasthan by the Bhopal-based Mahila Chetna Manch in 2002-2003 
revealed that proper information dissemination about the norm was not in place. 
Economically and socially vulnerable sections were the worst affected. 78 per cent 
of all cases studied belong to the scheduled, castes, and Other Backward Classes.
39
 
Also, the rule was seen as a potential tool for misuse, with women facing a double-
edged challenge. 
 
It should however be pointed out that the political space provided to women in 
panchayats has started to bring about change, though slowly. The findings of a 
study of the working of panchayats in six states conducted by PRIA reveals that 
“.......... 25 per cent woman notice change in their status within their family after 
they have been elected........... about 60 per cent of women said that they would 
encourage women to stand for election. The same percentage (60 per cent) is 
contemplating to contest PRI election again”.40 
 
 
Decentralised Planning: the District Planning Committees 
 
Another important area where the State Governments have shown scant regard for 
constitutional provision is the area of district planning. The Constitutional 
Amendment requires State Governments to constitute District Planning 
Committees (DPCs) in order to facilitate decentralised planning. A decade has 
passed and progress is alarmingly slow as is evident from the table below: 
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Table No. 2 
 
SI. No. State/Uts Whether DPCs have been constituted If yes, who is the Chairperson 
1 Andhra Pradesh Not constituted   
2 Arunachal Pradesh Not constituted   
3 Assam Not constituted   
4 Bihar  Not constituted   
5 Chhattisgarh Constituted      Minister 
6 Goa Not constituted   
7 Gujarat  Not constituted   
8 
Haryana (No. of Districts : 
19) Constituted (Only in 16 Districts) Deputy Commissioner 
9 
Himachal Pradesh (No. of 
Districts-12) Constituted (Only in 6 Districts.  Minister) 
10 Jammu & Kashmir 
Yet to adopt the provision of 73rd 
Amendment Act.   
11 Jharkhand Not constituted   
12 Karnataka Constituted    Zilla panchayat president 
13 Kerala constituted  Zilla panchayat president 
14 Madhya Pradesh constituted Minister-in-charge of district 
15 Maharashtra Not constituted   
16 
Manipur (No. of districts : 
4) constituted only in 2 districts       Zilla parishad ,president 
17 Meghalaya 73rd and 74th Amendments not applicable 
18 Mizoram 
73rd and 74th Amendments       not 
applicable not applicable 
19 Nagtaland  73rd and 74th Amendments not applicable 
20 Orissa  constituted     Minister 
21 Punjab Not constituted   
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22 Rajasthan  constituted Zilla panchayat  president 
23 Sikkim  constituted Zilla panchayat  president 
24 Tamil Nadu  constituted                        Zilla panchayat  president 
25 Tripura Not constituted   
26 Uttar Pradesh constituted Minister-in-charge of districts 
27 Uttaranchal  constituted  Minister 
28 West Bengal constituted    Zilla parishad president 
No DPC in Darjeeling district. Metro Planning committee in Kolkata District.   
29 A & N Islands constituted Zilla parishad president 
30 Chandigarh 
Government has decided not to constitute 
DPCs as 90% of population is covered by 
municipalities   
31 D & N Haveli constituted   Zilla panchayat  president 
32 Daman & Diu constituted Zilla parishad president 
33   NCT of Delhi     
34 Lakshadweep constituted Development Commissioner 
35 Pondichery Not constituted   
 
 
Source: ISS Documentation and Information Centre Panchayati Raj Update July, 2003 
 
 
In some states, the District Planning Committees (DPCs) are chaired by the minister of the State Government as in Madhya Pradesh, 
whereas in other states, the officials head the DPC, as in Tamil Nadu where the collector is the chairman. All these practices are 
inconsistent with the very spirit of the constitutional amendments on democratic decentralisation. The table below shows the composition 
of the DPCs in different states: 
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Composition of District Planning Committees in various States 
 
Table No. 3 
 
State Total 
Members 
Elected 
Members 
Nominated 
Members 
Chairperson Secretary 
Kerala 15 12 03 President of the Zilla Parishad District Collector 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
15-25 Four-
fifths 
One-fifth Minister nominated by the State Govt. District Collector 
Maharashtra 30-50 Four-
fifths 
One-fifth Minister nominated by the State Govt. District Collector 
West 
Bengal 
10-100 
depending 
on size of 
the district 
Four-
fifths 
One-fifth President of the Zilla Parishad District Magistrate 
Rajasthan 25 20 5 President of the Zilla Parishad Chief Planning Officer of ZP 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
20-40 Four-
fifths 
One-fifth Minister nominated by the State Govt. Chief                        
Development Officer of the 
District 
Karnataka   Four-
fifths 
One-fifth President of the Zilla Parishad Mayor/ 
Municipal President of District Hq. Vice 
Chairman 
CEO of ZP 
Tamil Nadu   Four-
fifths 
One-fifth Chairman - ZP President,  
Vice Chairman – Collector. 
CEO of District Panchayat 
 
 
Doubts have also been expressed about whether it would be possible on the part of retired or serving officials associated with the work of 
the government to play their roles properly. Interestingly, the Eleventh Finance Commission observed that the appointment of serving 
officers as chairman or members put a limitation on the SFC to act as an autonomous body to make recommendations in a free and 
independent manner.  
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The Rise of Parallel Bodies 
 
Table No. 4 
 
Added to the above is the emergence of a series of parallel bodies in different states as shown in the chart below. 
 
Source: Participatory Research in Asia (2002) Parallel Bodies and Panchayati Raj Institutions: Experiences from the States.
 No. State Parallel Body Areas of overlap/substitution Institutional Linkage with PRIs. 
1. Uttar 
Pradesh 
Water User Group (WUG)/Site 
Implementation Committee 
(SIC) 
 Formulating, developing and 
approving plans of the area covered 
by the WUG  
 Selection of beneficiaries (farmers)  
 Construction, maintenance and 
management of link and main drains  
 Policy decisions like decision on 
rates of water charges.  
Village Pradhan may be the ex-officio chairperson of the 
SIC. 
2. Haryana Gram Vikas Samity Supervision of construction of work out of 
the funds released by HRDF Board, 
decentralised planning or any other state 
government scheme. 
The samity consist of 4 members of gram panchayat 
Chairperson – Sarpanch Elected Members – one panch each 
from SC community, BC community and a woman panch 
3. Andhra 
Pradesh 
Janmabhoomi Planning and implementation of development 
programmes at the local level 
Sarpanch and the concerned ward member finds 
representation in the Habitation Level Committee of 
Janmabhoomi. 
4. Gujarat Joint Forest Management  Cultivation, collection and sale of 
minor forest produce  
 Conservation and maintenance of 
common property resources  
 A representative of village panchayat will serve as 
one of the members of the mandal or committee  
 Village panchayat itself may become a mandal or 
committee for the purpose of JFM.  
5. Rajasthan Watershed Minor Irrigation Panchayats can become Project Implementing Agency 
(PIA) for watershed projects on priority basis. 
6. Himachal 
Pradesh 
Vigilance Committee Supervision of gram panchayat 
works/schemes costing upto Rs.50,000/- 
Supervisory body within gram panchayat of the works, 
schemes and other activities of Gram Panchayat. 
7. West 
Bengal 
District Primary Education 
Council 
Overlapping with Standing Committee on 
Education at District and Intermediate level. 
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Broadly speaking, the functions performed by the parallel bodies can be classified 
as ensuring user\beneficiary participation, convergence of programmes and 
promoting\ensuring efficiency. While these are the basic functions of the PRIs, the 
matters like irrigation, watershed management and development and minor forest 
produce come under the purview of the Eleventh Schedule which lays down the 
functions of the PRIs .The Gram Vikas Samity in Haryana and the Vigilance 
Committee in Himachal Pradesh encroach upon the statutory functions of the 
panchayat bodies as spelt out in the Panchayat Acts of the respective states. The 
Janmabhoomi (JB) programme tends to mobilize local people, the entire state 
administrative machinery and draws upon all existing central and state government 
schemes as resource for development work, thus substituting the functions of the 
Gram Panchayat. Although the Sarpanch is to preside over the JB Gram Sabha, the 
real player is the officer which has created another problem. The Gram Sabha 
meetings convened by the Gram Panchayat have become less important because of 
the realization on the part of the people that fewer benefits are available through 
panchayats. 
 
There is another set of parallel bodies in states like Maharastra where 
traditional panchayats exist with different legitimising sources. In Maharastra, for 
example, there exist village “collectives” called “Gavki”. The 'Gavki' is constituted 
by the elite upper castes, the rich and undoubtedly, only the patriarchs of the 
village, women are excluded. Before the amendment of the constitution these 
bodies functioned alongside the elected panchayats. Unfortunately, they continue 
till today. Lele narrates an interesting case of how a „Gavki‟ defied the panchayat. 
The 'Gavki' decided to auction the sand from the riverbed and the money earned 
was to be a contribution to its own fund. The GP raised objections to it and a 
conflict arose. The persons, who raised objection to this issue, were the more 
informed active villagers, some dalits and women, associated with a local NGO 
who were in favour of the panchayats. However, in the long run they failed to go 
against the „Gavki‟. The „Gavki‟ has been found to be more effective in areas 
where women or dalits are in power. Thus, as Lele rightly observes “reservations 
which intended to empower both these marginalised sections in rural governance 
are being made ineffective by the established powers in the rural areas”41 
 
The general reaction against the parallel bodies is that they represent processes 
external to the constitutionally mandated role of panchayats and enable 
bureaucracies to override democratic bodies. Thus they pose serious threats to the 
effective functioning of local self- governing institutions. 
 
 
Actions of Some of the State Governments 
 
Legislative actions and decisions of some of the State Governments are 
undermining the process of democratic decentralisation. For example, the 
Chhattisgarh government has passed an order prescribing basic literacy as the 
minimum educational qualification for contesting a panchayat seat. This provision 
has dangerous implications as it will reduce the democratic space for ordinary 
people particularly poor women, minorities and the dalits, many of whom do not 
have basic literacy. It seems repugnant to the spirit of the constitutional mandate of 
panchayats as instruments of planning for economic development and social 
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justice. It will thus impede the process of empowerment for a large mass of 
population in view of the fact there is still a chunk of population without basic 
literacy.
42
 
 
Another interesting case of similar nature is the constitution of the Third State 
Finance Commission by the Government of Kerala under the chairmanship of a 
retired IAS officer who was Chief Secretary earlier and is currently involved with 
the work of the Government of Kerala. The other two members are serving officers 
– Secretary, Expenditure and Secretary, Local Administration. The SFCs are 
modelled on the Union Finance Commission. It is intended to take an objective, 
enlightened and independent view in making recommendations in order to enable 
local government institutions as institutions of self government as envisaged in the 
73
rd
 and 74
th
 Amendments of the constitution. The SFCs are required to fix the size 
of the divisible pool and to design methods for inter se distribution of the share of 
the local bodies on an equitable and efficient basis. It also has to evaluate the 
critical gap at various levels, taking into account the tax assignment, on the one 
hand and financial responsibilities on the other. It has been argued that the 
appointment of serving officers as chairperson or members might make it difficult 
for members to play the desired role. 
 
The District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs), which handle crores of 
rupees, should have disappeared from the scene following the 73rd amendment of 
the Constitution. However there is no such sign of this. The battle continues in 
some states. The DRDAs have been constituted as late as in 2002. Some State 
Governments have refused to comply with the Central Government guidelines to 
ensure that DRDAs are merged with the ZPs. The Central Government has failed 
to enforce this.  
 
 
Transparency: Right to Information 
 
One of the objectives of democratic decentralization is to make governance 
transparent. For that purpose a few state governments like Rajasthan and Madhya 
Pradesh have taken legal initiatives, such as, granting the right to information. 
What is happening in the field is a matter of really grave concern. The Majdoor 
Kishan Shakti Sanghatan (MKSS) in Rajasthan led by Ms. Aruna Roy sought all 
records pertaining to the five year development activities in the Janpad Panchayat 
in February, 2002.
43
 The Gram Sevak refused to give information for 10 months. 
Later on, the Gram Sabha passed a resolution that the information asked for could 
not be provided because it would create tension in the area. The district officials 
took the plea of the resolution and expressed their helplessness. It was argued that 
the panchayat is a constitutional body. It is, therefore, not possible for officials to 
intervene in order to compel the panchayat to furnish information. The MKSS met 
the Chief Minister and the Panchayati Raj Minister without any effective results. 
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Concluding Observations 
 
Democratic decentralisation in rural India today faces a lot of challenges from 
within and without. These are strong enough to derail the engine of rural 
decentralization, if suitable steps are not taken in time by the central government 
and the union parliament, the state government and the legislature, the bureaucracy 
and the social structure.
44
 Given this background, one has reasons to express doubts 
about the future of constitutionally ordained PR bodies as institutions of self-
government and instruments of economic development and social justice. 
There is nevertheless a certain silver lining. It has been realized by the Indian 
State that another round of Constitutional amendment is necessary to strengthen 
PRIs and for this purpose a high-powered committee consisting of selected Chief 
Ministers has already been constituted. Second, there has been an increasing 
interest of the people and the press in panchayati raj. Third, civil society 
organizations across the country have started taking an active interest in the 
promotion of democratic decentralization. These silver linings offer a ray of hope 
and, if they work well, one may envisage PRIs emerging as institutions of 
democratic power and governance with some strength and vigour in the days to 
come.  
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